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Abstract
A guest-worker program can be a very flexible and convenient way of meeting labor
shortages in a host country, assuming that the migrants adhere to the rules of the program.
This article investigates the conditions under which guest workers have sufficient incen-
tives for voluntary return to their country of origin when their work permits expire. Should
they choose to overstay, the article examines how various factors influence the optimal
duration of the overstay phase of a foreign worker’s planning horizon. The analysis is
conducted in the context of a lenient enforcement regime that avoids deportations of
undocumented aliens. It relies instead on eligibility criteria and pricing instruments, such
as partial withholding of salary and an exit tax for those who overstay, to provide incentives
for voluntary return at the end of the contract period. (JEL code: F22)
Keywords: temporary migration, overstaying, voluntary return, guest workers, retirement
benefits
1 Introduction
Guest-worker programs of various shapes and forms have been utilized
extensively since World War II to meet shortages of low- and semi-skilled
labor in the advanced and rapidly growing emerging economies. The
Bracero program (1942–1964), established to recruit Mexican workers
for temporary employment in the USA., is one of the early examples.
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, Western European countries introduced tempor-
ary migration schemes to meet the growing demand for labor in the
manufacturing sector. Following the oil price shock of 1973, these schemes
were wound down. At the same time, the oil-producing countries in the
Middle East, especially those with a small indigenous labor force,
expanded their temporary migration programs to the point where foreign
workers now account for most (and in some exceptional cases practically
all) of the work force in the private sector (see Kapiszewski 2006). Rapid
growth in East Asia also generated labor shortages in the late 1980’s and
1990’s. In the case of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Brunei, Japan, Thailand, and Malaysia, these shortages have been
addressed by recruiting temporary foreign workers or trainees to work
in small-scale manufacturing, construction, agriculture, food processing,
and various labor-intensive service activities.
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Temporary migration is an attractive mode of international labor mobil-
ity for the host countries. It enables them to meet labor shortages without
having to make long-term commitments to foreign workers with respect
to permanent settlement, political rights, and access to social programs.
At the same time, temporary migration schemes offer much greater labor-
market flexibility than permanent migration programs.1 An important
concern for the policymakers, however, is that the migrants may not
choose to go back when their work permit expires. As pointed out by
Millbank (2006), a major problem that host countries have to deal with
is that guest workers who agree initially to the program rules may decide
to overstay. In East Asian economies, as well as in some of the labor-
importing countries of the Middle East, permanent settlement of foreigners
who were admitted as temporary low-skilled workers is a critical issue for
the authorities. They fear that it can have an irreversible impact on the
ethnic composition of the population, threaten the country’s cultural
homogeneity, and adversely affect the political and economic status
of the natives. By contrast, the states in Western Europe and North
America are less alarmed by the prospect of a temporary migrant trying
to remain in the country permanently. Yet, even in these relatively more
permissive immigration regimes, the authorities are becoming increasingly
vigilant when it comes to enforcing legislation pertaining to illegal
immigration.2
East Asian economies have addressed the problem of overstaying guest
workers, in part, by applying very strict deportation measures. These
measures, however, can be very costly in economic terms.3 They are also
costly in terms of a country’s human-rights image, as deportations are
sometimes fiercely resisted by the deportees, resulting even in fatalities
1 Ethier (1985) provides a pioneering analysis of the welfare implications of guest-worker
migration in a model of international trade. See also Schiff (2007, 2011 unpublished
manuscript), Winters et al. (2003), Djajic´ (2013), Djajic´ et al. (2012), and Djajic´ and
Michael (2013) for theoretical treatment and GAO (2006), Martin (2003), Martin and
Titelbaum (2001), Abella (2006, 2009), Hahn and Choi (2006), Park (2008), Satoshi
(2008), and Ruhs (2005) for more descriptive analysis. An extensive discussion of the
successes and failures of temporary migration programs in the past is provided by
Ruhs (2002). Orranius and Zavodny (2010), Djajic´ (2011), and Peri (2012) offer sugges-
tions for reforming the current system in the USA.
2 Throughout the article, we shall assume that a goal of the authorities of the host country
is to minimize the number of guest workers who overstay. As noted by a referee, such an
objective may not always be in the economic interest of the host country.
3 According to the Associated Press (2011), the cost of apprehending, processing, detaining,
and deporting an illegal alien in the USA is estimated to be $12,500 per person. In the
UK, between 1998 and 2009, 111,265 illegal immigrants have been deported at the aver-
age cost of £11,000 per person (BBC 2009). In Norway, as reported by Berglund (2013),
each deportation costs on average NOK 50,000 (USD 9000). This is due to the required
paperwork and transport involved, often including police escorts.
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related to the procedure. Advanced Western countries are therefore rather
reluctant to resort to deportations. Notable exceptions are cases of illegal
aliens who have completed serving a prison sentence related to criminal
activities.4
Under the assumption that the authorities of the host country avoid
relying on deportation measures, this article analyzes how various factors
influence a guest worker’s choice between returning voluntarily to the
home country at the end of the contract or overstaying and becoming
an undocumented worker in the underground economy of the host coun-
try. Should it be optimal to overstay under a given set of conditions,
the study examines the impact of host-country policies on the optimal
duration of the overstay phase of a migrant’s planning horizon. The
framework of our analysis is based on that developed in Section 2 of
Djajic´ (2013). The present study differs, however, with respect to its object-
ives as well as in terms of the policy instruments assumed to be available to
the authorities. The objectives are (i) to examine for the first time how
immigration policies of the host country influence the optimal duration of
the overstay period of a guest worker, when adequate incentives for vol-
untary return at the end of his/her contract are not in place and (ii) to
characterize the policy environment that results in strict compliance with
the program rules. By contrast, the focus of Djajic´ (2013) is on the con-
ditions under which a guest worker prefers voluntary return at the end of
the contact over a permanent overstay as an undocumented worker.
With respect to tools of immigration policy, we consider two additional
policy instruments that can help induce guest workers to return home
voluntarily at the end of their contract: (i) a penalty for having overstayed,
which is imposed on an illegal alien when exiting the country and
(ii) a salary withholding scheme.5 Penalties for overstaying are very
4 Due to budget cuts, noncriminal illegal aliens, awaiting deportation in the US detention
system, were gradually being released in February 2013. According to Randy Beck,
Justice Thomas O. Marshall chair of constitutional law at the University of Georgia,
the problem is essentially financial: ‘Look, we don’t have the resources to deport every-
body. We have to pick and choose and we’re just going to choose people who have
committed serious offenses’ (Hamilton 2013).
5 These instruments are also considered in Section 4 of Djajic´ (2013), although in a much
simpler framework of analysis, which excludes, for instance, consideration of interna-
tional price-level differentials, interest-rate differentials, and time discounting.
Moreover, that previous work is based on the assumption that guest workers are paid
wages that are substantially below those of native workers, which gives them an incentive
to run away from their contractual employer. In the present study, we assume that guest
workers and natives receive similar wages. Finally, in Section 4 of Djajic´ (2013), over-
staying guest workers are assumed to face an environment in which a permanent overstay
is optimal. They return to S only if deported by the authorities of H, as in Vinogradova
(2014). In the present study, we assume that the authorities of H do not resort to deport-
ation measures.
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common in both Western and Asian countries. They often consist of
monetary fines and/or other forms of punishment, such as a jail sentence
or a ban on reentry, which may be for a specific period of time or perman-
ent. We also extend the framework of analysis used in previous studies by
considering explicitly the retirement phase of a worker’s planning horizon
and examining its role in influencing the optimal timing of return.
The remainder of the article has the following structure. Section 2
defines the maximization problem of a guest worker who intends to
return voluntarily at the end of the contract period and of a guest
worker who intends to overstay for an additional x units of time, where
x is optimally chosen. In Section 3, discounted lifetime utility associated
with these two choices is compared with that of a nonmigrant to charac-
terize the conditions under which a temporary migration program is able
to attract participants and induce them to return to their countries of
origin when the work permit expires. Should it be optimal for a guest
worker to overstay, our model relates the duration of the undocumented
phase to the immigration policies of the host country and other param-
eters of the model that characterize the environment facing a foreign
worker. Section 4 summarizes the main policy implications of the model.
2 A Guest Worker’s Problem
Consider a two-country world consisting of a source country (S) and a
host country (H). Suppose that H recruits workers from S on temporary
contracts that require each migrant to work for his contractual employer
for  units of time. Some countries allow migrants to renew their work
permits, provided the request is supported by the employer. This is still
the case, for example, in most of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.
In other countries, work (or trainee) permits of low-skilled migrants are
non-renewable or can be renewed for only a specific period of time: the
maximum duration of stay for low-skilled guest workers (or trainees) is
3 years in Japan, 4 years in Singapore and on Cyprus, 5 years in Israel
and Malaysia, and 6 years in South Korea and Taiwan. In what follows,
we shall assume that the work permits are valid for  units of time, non-
renewable, and made available to migrants at what we define to be the age
of 0 (i.e. the beginning of the planning horizon).
To provide a strong incentive for contract completion and voluntary
return to the source country, we assume that the employer withholds a
fraction  of a migrant’s wage for the entire duration of the contract
period. The practice of withholding part of a worker’s salary to guarantee
contract completion has been common in the Middle East and East Asia.
It was also required under the Bracero program, where the US
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government withheld 10% of earnings in an effort to ensure that the
Bracero workers were only temporary migrants.
Let us assume that the withheld earnings are returned to the migrant
(with interest) at time , conditional on voluntary departure. Assuming
that the salary withholding rate is smaller than a guest worker’s optimal
saving rate while abroad, a worker who intends to return to the source
country at time  is not affected by the withholding scheme. It essentially
serves as a savings plan. The withholding measure bites only in the event
the worker chooses to overstay.
Guest workers earn the foreign nominal wage, w, and the foreign rate
of return, r, on accumulated savings (including withheld earnings). When
a worker returns to S, she works for the wage wð< wÞ and invests
the repatriated savings in an activity that yields the rate of return
r > r.6 We shall assume that w;w; r, and r are all constant. At time
T, a worker goes into retirement until the end of the planning horizon
at t ¼ Tþ R, where R is the duration of the retirement phase. Retiring in
the country of origin is assumed to offer a flow of benefits which has a
value of b. This flow may consist of public-sector transfers or it can be
more broadly interpreted to represent returns on social capital that the
migrant enjoys in her community of origin.7
2.1 A migrant who obeys the rules of the program
For a guest worker who intends to return voluntarily at the end of the
contract period, the problem is to maximize Vm, the discounted utility
from consumption abroad (from time 0 to ) and at home (from time 
to T+R), by choosing the optimal consumption rate at each point in time.
max
ct ;ct
Vm ¼
Z 
0
uðct Þetdtþ
Z TþR

uðctÞetdt; ð1Þ
6 Evidence on the rates of return on repatriated assets of returnees is scarce. Nonetheless,
these rates seem to be (or should be) considerably higher than the rates available on
savings in the host country (see, e.g. Penny 1986; Swallow and Brokken 1987; de Mel
et al. 2008 and Udry and Anagol 2006).
7 Pension systems in developing countries, to the extent they exist, tend to have very limited
coverage. Supplementary private-sector programs are available in most countries, but
they are typically aimed at the higher income segments of the work force and have
little relevance for returning guest workers. Lack of fiscal resources, a large informal
sector, lack of information on earnings, and financial constraints on workers that limit
their capacity to contribute to pension schemes are some of the key problems that stand in
the way of establishing broad public pension programs in the developing countries.
By introducing b, what we have in mind is a minimum-pension program that uncondi-
tionally provides a pension to the elderly residents, regardless of income or work history,
such as the programs in Bolivia, Botswana, Mauritius, and Namibia. Minimum pension
schemes also exist in South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay,
although these are subject to means testing.
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with ct and ct being the rates of consumption abroad and after
return to S, respectively.8 The migrant’s rate of time preference, , is
assumed to be constant and the utility function is concave, twice differ-
entiable, and invariant with respect to the location where consumption
takes place.
Utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint which requires
that the savings accumulated abroad (including withheld wages), net of
migration costs, plus any initial asset holdings, A0, are equal to the
appropriately discounted excess of consumption over wage income after
return. The cost of migration is assumed to be a constant K  A0:9 Using
the date of return  as the point of reference, we may express a guest
worker’s budget constraint as follows:Z 
0
ðw  pt ct Þer
ðtÞdt ðK A0Þer
¼ 
Z T

ðw ptctÞerðtÞdt
Z TþR
T
ðb ptctÞerðtÞdt; ð2Þ
where pt and p

t are the prices at t of the unique consumption good avail-
able in both S and H, respectively.10 The Lagrangian associated with this
8 If w and  are large enough, a migrant may prefer to return to S before time  (see Djajic´
2010). For realistic values of the parameters that characterize the conditions facing guest
workers, however, they typically wish to remain abroad until the completion of their
contract. Cases of migrants returning to S before time  usually occur as a result of
unexpected developments at home or at the workplace. We shall exclude such cases by
assumption.
9 For a theoretical analysis of the problem facing migrants who are liquidity constrained
and need to borrow funds to pay for migration costs, see Friebel and Guriev (2006) and
Djajic´ and Vinogradova (2013, 2014).
10 The budget constraint (2) reflects our assumption that  is smaller than the migrant’s
optimal saving rate while abroad. If  is larger than the optimal saving propensity, then
the withholding scheme does represent an additional constraint in the migrants optimiza-
tion program. We would then need to take it into account by introducing two budget
constraints—one for the period [0,] and another for ð;Tþ R—as follows:Z 
0
½ð1 Þw  pt ct er
ðtÞdt ðK A0Þer  0;
Z TþR

ptcte
rðtÞdt
Z 
0
wer
ðtÞdtþ
Z T

werðtÞdtþ
Z TþR
T
berðtÞdt
 
¼ 0:
Solving for the optimal saving rate abroad, it turns out that the exact condition on  such
that the withholding scheme does not represent an additional constraint for the migrant
is that  < ; where
 ¼
ðegðTþRÞ1Þ
g ðp

p Þ1=1  wð1e
rðTÞ Þ
wr  bðe
rðTÞerðTþRÞ Þ
wr þ ðK A0Þer

ðer1Þ
r þ ðe
gðTþRÞ1Þ
g ðp

p Þ1=1
:
Our numerical simulations suggest that for a very wide range of parameters this
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maximization problem may be written as follows:
L ¼
Z 
0
uðct Þetdtþ
Z TþR

uðctÞetdtþ 
Z 
0
ðw  pt ct Þer
tdt ðK A0Þ

þ er
Z T

ðw ptctÞerðtÞdtþ er
Z TþR
T
ðb ptctÞerðtÞdt

The first order conditions consist of
@L
@ct
¼ u0ðct Þet  pt er
t ¼ 0; t 2 ½0; Þ ð3Þ
@L
@ct
¼ u0ðctÞet  ptertþðrrÞ ¼ 0; t 2 ð;Tþ R ð4Þ
and the budget constraint (2). Let us simplify the analysis by assuming
that  ¼ r and that the prices of consumption abroad and at home are
constant at the levels p and p, respectively. We can then write eqs. (3) and
(4) as follows:
u0ðct Þ ¼ p; ð5Þ
u0ðctÞ ¼ peðrrÞðtÞ: ð6Þ
We observe in (5) that u0ðct Þ is constant. The corresponding rate of con-
sumption ct is therefore also constant at c
. It is realistic to assume that
the price of the standard unit of consumption is higher abroad than it is at
home (i.e. p < p). Equations (5) and (6) then imply that at time , return
to S (where the price of consumption is relatively lower) triggers an
upward jump in the consumption rate. Letting the utility function
take the form uðxÞ ¼ x1=ð1 Þ, and using (5) and (6), we may write
c ¼ cðp=pÞ1= > c, which relates the magnitude of the jump in con-
sumption to the ratio of the price levels and the degree of concavity of
the utility function. Along with Equation (6), this implies that
ct ¼ cðp=pÞ1=e rr

ð ÞðtÞ; t 2 ð;Tþ R; ð7Þ
constraint is never binding. In fact, the value of  is always well above 50% for the
realistic calibrations that we use in our analysis. This is considerably higher than, for
example, the 10% withholding rate of the Bracero program.
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where 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal consumption substitution.
Using (7), the budget constraint (2) can be written as follows:
ðw  pcÞ
r
ðer  1Þ  ðK A0Þer  pc
ðp=pÞ1=
g
ðegðTþRÞ  1Þ
þ wð1 e
rðTÞÞ þ bðerðTÞ  erðTþRÞÞ
r
¼ 0;
ð8Þ
where g ¼ ½ðr Þ=  rx0: This yields the solution for c as a function
of the model’s parameters: migration cost, K, the maximum allowed dur-
ation of stay abroad, , the foreign and domestic wage rates, w and w,
foreign and domestic commodity prices, p and p, initial asset holdings,
A0, the rate of return, r, on accumulated savings, the remaining working
life, T, at the time of migration, and finally the duration of the retirement
phase, R, and the flow of benefits, b, enjoyed by a retiree at home:
c ¼
wðer1Þ
r þ wð1e
rðTÞÞ
r þ bðe
rðTÞerðTþRÞÞ
r  ðK A0Þer

pðer1Þ
r þ pðe
gðTþRÞ1Þ
g ðp

p Þ1=
: ð9Þ
Using Equation (9) in (7), and introducing the resulting expression into
Equation (1) yields
Vm ¼ ðc
Þ1
1 
1 e

 
þ ðc
Þ1ðp=pÞ1
1 
egðTþRÞr
  e
g
 
: ð10Þ
With c given by (9), this is the discounted level of utility enjoyed by a
guest worker who obeys the rules of the program and returns to S at t ¼ .
2.2 The problem facing an overstayer
If a guest worker remains abroad after the work permit expires at time ,
he/she forfeits the withheld wages,
R 
0 w
er
ðtÞdt, and faces a fine in the
amount , should he/she try to exit the host country after having over-
stayed. Penalties for overstaying can take different forms: they can be
pecuniary in nature and/or involve imprisonment, as in Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and other Asian countries (see
Vinogradova 2011), or they may take the form of a ban on reentry for a
certain number of years, as for example, in Japan, the USA., and the states
of Western Europe.11 Regardless of the form of penalty, for it to be fully
11 An individual residing unlawfully in the USA for more than 180 days, but less than one
year, is barred from reentering for a period of 3 years. If the person is unlawfully present
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effective, it must not exceed the cost of avoiding the penalty, should it be a
fine or a prison term, by clandestinely exiting the host country. The cost of
a clandestine exit can be very high, as in the case of Japan and South
Korea, or much lower, as in countries with penetrable land borders, such
as the USA. or the Schengen zone. In what follows, we shall assume that 
is below the cost of a clandestine exit.
As is the case in most countries, overstaying also implies that once the
work permit expires at time , the migrant is obliged to seek employment
in the underground economy and earns a lower wage: Not the wage w,
but rather the wage wu ¼ wð1 Þ > w, where the fraction  represents
the wage penalty associated with having undocumented status in the labor
market of the host country.12 For the USA, studies conducted by Rivera-
Batiz (1999, 2000) and Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) suggest that the
wage penalty associated with undocumented status was roughly 20% in
the 1990s. The wage penalty, ; is likely to be higher in economies with
stricter internal enforcement measures.13
Discounted utility, VOS, of a guest worker who is determined to overstay
in H for an additional x units of time can be obtained by solving the
following optimization problem:
max
ct ;ct;x
Vos ¼
Z þx
0
ðcost Þ1
1  e
tdtþ
Z TþR
þx
ðcost Þ1
1  e
tdt; ð11Þ
for 1 year or more, upon departing, he or she becomes inadmissible for 10 years.
Penalties for overstaying can take many different shapes and forms. In the case of
New Zealand’s temporary migration program, the so-called Recognised Seasonal
Employer scheme, which recruits workers from a number of Pacific island economies,
an effective penalty for overstaying can in fact be imposed by the community at origin.
As pointed out by Gibson and McKenzie (forthcoming), competition for placement in
the program among communities in the countries of origin gives rise to social pressures
on migrants not to overstay, as that would create a negative reputation for one’s com-
munity and jeopardize migration opportunities for other community members.
12 A number of labor-importing countries in the Middle East and East Asia offer wages to
foreign contract workers or ‘trainees’ which are in some cases a small fraction of the
wage paid to native workers for similar work (See Section 4 of Djajic´ 2013 and Djajic´ and
Mesnard unpublished manuscript). In such a regime, foreign contract workers and trai-
nees have a strong incentive to run away from their contractual employer and look for
work in the underground economy, where wages are higher than those paid to docu-
mented foreign workers. We ignore such regimes in the present study, focusing only on
the case where documented foreign workers are paid wages which are similar to those
earned by native workers in the same occupation.
13 A guest worker’s salary withholding rate, , and the wage penalty for undocumented
work, , have similar roles in the present model. They both make it less attractive to
overstay. An important distinction between the two is that withheld salary represents a
fixed cost of choosing to overstay, with the cost directly proportional to the withholding
rate and the duration, , of the official employment contract. By contrast, we can think
of  as a ‘variable’ cost that eats away part of the benefits of overstaying at each instant
over the entire overstay phase.
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subject to
A0  K erðþxÞ þ
Z 
0
½wð1 Þ  pcost er
tdt
þ
Z þx

½wð1 Þ  pcost er
tdtþ erðþxÞ
Z T
þx
½w pcost erðtxÞdt
þ erðþxÞ
Z TþR
T
½b pcost erðtxÞdt ¼ 0;
ð12Þ
where cost and c
os
t are the consumption rates abroad and at home of a
worker who intends to overstay in H, with the duration of the undocu-
mented stay, x, optimally chosen. This problem has a number of features
similar to the one examined in the Appendix of Djajic´ (2013). In the pre-
sent study, however, we consider a richer policy environment that includes
withholding of wages, which are forfeited if the migrant does not leave
at the end of the contract period, and a penalty for violating the rules of
the program that consists of a fine, , if and when the worker decides
to exit the host country. Relegating the somewhat tedious algebraic steps
required for the solution of this problem to the Appendix A.1, we simply
define here VOS to be the discounted welfare of a guest worker who over-
stays in H until he/she finds it optimal to return to S. In Section 3, we will
study the conditions under which a guest worker has no incentive to over-
stay and examine how the optimal duration of the undocumented phase
is affected by the immigration policies of the host country and other par-
ameters that influence a migrant’s behavior.
2.3 Utility of a nonmigrant
If a worker chooses not to migrate, his/her problem is to
max
cnt
Vn ¼
Z TþR
0
ðcnt Þ1
1  e
tdt ð13Þ
subject to the budget constraint
A0 þ
Z T
0
ðw pcnt Þertdtþ
Z TþR
T
ðb pcnt Þertdt ¼ 0; ð14Þ
where cnt is a nonmigrant’s consumption rate.
Following the usual steps of the optimization program, we find that
cnt ¼ cn0e
r
 t and cn0 ¼
½A0 þ wr ð1 erTÞ þ br ðerT  erðTþRÞÞg
pðegðTþRÞ  1Þ ; ð15Þ
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and the discounted lifetime utility
Vn ¼
Z TþR
0
½cn0e
r
 t1
1  e
tdt ¼ ðc
n
0Þ1
1 
ðegðTþRÞ  1Þ
g
; ð16Þ
with cn0 given by (15) and g ¼ ðrÞ  rx 0:
3 Temporary Migration with No Overstays
The objective of this article is 2-fold. To examine the conditions under
which temporary migrants, who are recruited on a contract of the duration
, have no incentive to overstay and, second, to study the relationship
between immigration policies and the optimal duration of the overstay
period if the incentives for voluntary return happen to be inadequate.
In addressing these related problems, we compare the discounted utility
of a temporary migrant who abides by the rules of the program, with those
of a nonmigrant and of a guest worker who intends to overstay in H as an
illegal alien for x additional units of time, where x is optimally chosen.
From an expositional point of view, it is most illuminating to examine
this problem by means of numerical simulations, using a specific example.
Our choice of parameter values for this exercise is intended to reflect the
conditions facing migrants from South and South-East Asia who work on
temporary contracts in the manufacturing, construction and various ser-
vice sectors of the economies in East Asia at wages comparable to those
earned by similarly qualified native workers.
Without any loss of generality, we normalize w, the wage per year in S,
and the country’s price level, p, to unity. For the benchmark case, we
assume that r ¼  ¼ :04 per year, r¼ .06, and  ¼ 0:95.14 Working life,
T, from the time of migration is set at 40 years, and the retirement period
R is assumed to be 10 years, with retirement benefits, b, enjoyed by a
returnee in the source country set equal to 50% of w. The cost of living
in H is assumed to be twice as high in relation to that in S (p ¼ 2), initial
liquid asset holdings are assumed to be equivalent to 2 years of wages in S
(A0 ¼ 2), the salary withholding rate of a guest worker is 10% ( ¼ 0:1),
the wage of an illegal alien in H is assumed to be 20% lower than that of
a documented guest worker ( ¼ :20), the penalty for overstaying is
assumed to be 10% of a guest worker’s yearly earnings in the host country
14 Most estimates of  seem to be in the range of 0.5 to 1.5 (see, e.g. Hansen and Singleton
1982; Keane and Wolpin 2001; Vissing-Jorgensen 2002; Favero 2005 and Kirdar 2012].
Values of  in the range between 0.9 and 1.0 tend to generate, however, the most realistic
patterns of saving behavior of temporary migrants (see Djajic´ 2010).
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( ¼ 0:1), and the cost of migration is equivalent to 2 year’s wages in S
(K¼ 2).15
The MO schedule in Figure 1 traces the combinations of  and w, with
other parameters at their benchmark levels, such that a migrant is indif-
ferent between voluntarily returning to S at t ¼  and overstaying beyond
the expiration of the work permit for x additional years, where x is opti-
mally chosen. Thus, at each point along MO, Vm ¼ Vos. The schedule is
positively sloped because an increase in w makes overstaying more
attractive, whereas an increase in the legal duration of stay in the host
country reduces the incentive to overstay. This is not only because the
amount of withheld wages that are lost by an overstayer increases with the
duration of a guest-worker’s contract, but also because a larger  enables
a migrant to save more while legally employed abroad. This reduces the
incentive to stay still longer in the foreign country. Anywhere above
(below) the MO schedule, overstaying yields a higher (lower) level of dis-
counted utility than does a voluntary return to S at the end of the contract
period. The optimal duration of the overstay phase, x, associated with
each point on MO is displayed by the X locus in the panel below. As an
example, consider a point on the MO schedule such that w ¼ 2:6 and 
roughly equal to 3. At this point, the migrant is indifferent between (i)
complying with the rules of the guest-worker program, which offers
a 3-year contract at w ¼ 2:6 and (ii) initially working as a guest worker
in H for 3 years and then foregoing the withheld wages to overstay in the
underground economy for 7 additional years, pay the exit fine and return
to S. The duration of overstay is positively related to the foreign wage
along the MO schedule, as higher combinations of w and  along MO
make it attractive to overstay for a longer period of time. For combin-
ations of w and  to the left of MO, the optimal duration of overstay is
longer than the one indicated on the X schedule at the corresponding value
of w.
The MN schedule illustrates combinations of  and w such that
Vm ¼ Vn. Thus, at any point along MN, workers in S are indifferent
between migrating according to the rules of the guest-worker program
and not migrating at all. The slope of MN is negative because an increase
in  makes M more attractive in relation to N in the relevant range,
requiring a lower w to keep Vm ¼ Vn.16 Anywhere above the MN
15 This is the amount, for instance, in the case of Thai migrants recruited on 2-year con-
tracts in Taiwan (see Jones and Pardthaisong 1999). As noted in the Human
Development Report (2009, p. 54), the recruitment fees for temporary employment con-
tracts overseas can be an even larger multiple of source-country earnings.
16 Djajic´ (2010) shows that, depending on the parameters of the model, there may exist a
large enough, critical value of  ¼  , such that an increase in the duration of stay abroad
above  makes a migrant worse off. Values of  which are relevant for most guest-worker
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Figure 1 The choice of migration options and the optimal duration of overstay.
programs around the world, and hence the values we consider in the present study, are
below  .
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locus, it pays to go abroad as a rule-abiding guest worker. Below the locus,
workers prefer to stay permanently at home.
The two schedules divide Figure 1 into three regions of interest to us in
the present study. In the region below the MN locus, the foreign wage and/
or the legal duration of stay in H is not sufficient to induce migrants to go
abroad and abide by the rules of the guest-worker program. For combin-
ations of w and  in the region to the left of MO and above MN, it pays to
migrate as a guest worker, but it is even better to subsequently overstay
and work in the host country without documentation. Finally, for com-
binations of w and  in the region to the right of MO and above MN, it is
optimal to migrate and strictly comply with the rules of the guest-worker
program. Thus, in both panels (a) and (b), the relevant combinations of w
and  in the discussion that follows are those above the MN schedule.
It is also worth noting that for parameter values in the benchmark case
and the ranges of w and  displayed in the figure, it does not pay for a
migrant to overstay permanently in the host country. It is clear that if we
were to consider higher values of w, we would eventually arrive at the
corner solution where an overstay for the entire working life of an
individual is optimal. Alternatively, reducing the assumed value of p
(or changes in other parameters) can result in a permanent overstay
being optimal. In the analysis below, our focus is on interior solutions.
4 Incentives for Strict Compliance
We consider next the role of immigration policies, focusing on the extent
to which they strengthen the incentives for strict compliance on the part of
workers. Should the incentives prove to be insufficient, resulting in guest
workers choosing to overstay, we examine the implications of each policy
for x, the optimal duration of the overstay phase of a worker’s planning
horizon. It is important to note that we are not considering here the impli-
cations of unanticipated changes in policies. Every policy change is thus
assumed to occur at the very beginning of an individual’s planning horizon
and is expected to be permanent.
4.1 Role of immigration policies
Wage penalty
Consider the impact of tightening internal enforcement aimed at employ-
ers of undocumented aliens. To the extent that such measures are effective,
they will tend to manifest themselves in the form of an increase in the wage
penalty, , facing undocumented workers. An increase in  from 0.2 to 0.3
is shown to shift the MO schedule up and to the left in panel (a) of
Figure 2. This signifies that if a migrant was initially indifferent between
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overstaying and voluntarily returning for a given combination of w and ,
he/she now prefers to return voluntarily. This is because a larger wage
penalty makes the overstay option relatively less attractive when com-
pared to voluntary return. Since an increase in  has no effect on the
behavior of nonmigrants and of documented guest workers who intend
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Figure 2 Effects of stricter internal enforcement measures.
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to return to S voluntarily at the end of their contract, the position of the
MN schedule remains unchanged.
In panel (b) below, we also observe a leftward shift of the X schedule,
indicating that the optimal duration of the overstay is shorter with a larger
 for each value of w along the new MO locus. The intuition here is very
similar to that pertaining to the analysis of the optimal timing of return of
documented workers, originally analyzed by Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988).
Other things being equal, lower expected earnings over the overstay phase
tend to reduce the benefit of overstaying an extra instant. This calls for
adjustments in consumption and in the duration of the overstay phase to
equalize once again, in terms of utility, the cost and the benefit of over-
staying an instant longer and to ensure that the budget constraint is satis-
fied. A lower time path of consumption and a shorter overstay phase is
optimal in this instance.17 Thus, an increase in  serves to (i) strengthen
the incentives for strict compliance with the rules of the guest-worker
program and (ii) should a worker, nonetheless, decide to overstay, it
reduces the optimal duration, x, of the undocumented phase of her plan-
ning horizon.
Withholding rate
Consider next the impact of a higher salary withholding rate. An increase
in  from 0.10 to 0.15% of a contract worker’s salary makes it less attract-
ive to overstay, as the loss of wages for any given combination of w and 
is greater. This implies that the MO schedule shifts up and to the left, as
illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 3. The MN locus remains unaffected
because the withholding scheme affects only those who overstay. Should
the now higher withholding rate still happen to be insufficient to induce
strict compliance on the part of guest workers [i.e. for combinations of w
and  in the ‘Overstay’ region above the MN schedule and to the left of
MO in panel (a) of Figure 3], a higher withholding rate actually gives an
incentive to those who overstay to do so for a longer period of time. This is
shown by the rightward shift of the X locus in panel (b) below: an over-
staying worker remains unambiguously longer in H, the larger the loss of
17 As noted by Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988), if the degree of concavity of the utility func-
tion is sufficiently high, theoretically one cannot rule out the possibility of a longer
planned duration of stay being optimal as a result of a cut in expected earnings
abroad. When the degree of concavity is high, a small cut in consumption can be suffi-
cient to generate the required increase in the utility value of savings resulting from
overstaying, to equalize the cost and the benefit of overstaying an extra instant, as
required by condition (20) in the Appendix. With a sufficiently small cut in consumption
being the optimal response to a reduction in expected earnings abroad, the budget con-
straint may well call for a longer optimal duration of the overstay phase. For the par-
ameter values of our benchmark case, however, we are far from obtaining such an
outcome.
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withheld wages, other things being equal. This finding can be better under-
stood by examining in the Appendix the optimality condition for the ter-
mination of the overstay phase, as stated in Equation (20). The
withholding rate  does not have any direct effect on the cost vs benefit
of staying an instant longer as an undocumented alien in the host country.
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Figure 3 Effects of an increase in the withholding rate.
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It does have a direct impact on the budget constraint, however, making a
longer overstay necessary to meet the cost of the optimal consumption
program. This results in a higher value of x being optimal at any given w
along the MO schedule.18
Fine for overstaying
An additional penalty for overstaying in the form of an exit fee operates in
the same manner. It imposes an extra financial burden on an overstaying
migrant and induces those who overstay to do so for a longer period
of time. Still, an increase in  provides a foreign contract worker with
a stronger incentive for strict compliance with the rules of the program.
It therefore shifts the MO schedule up and to the left, as in the case of an
increase in the withholding rate, depicted in panel (a) of Figure 3.
These findings have important implications for policy: (i) They establish
that increases in the salary withholding rate or in the overstay penalty
in the form of a monetary fine can deter guest workers from overstaying.
In this sense, they help address the problem of illegal immigration.
(ii) Should these measures fall short of being sufficient to induce strict
compliance on the part of participants, they turn out to be counterpro-
ductive: they contribute to an expansion in the stock of undocumented
aliens employed in the economy. In such cases of insufficiency, marginal
increases in the levels of  and/or  do not serve to reduce the flow of guest
workers transiting to undocumented status, but they do increase the
duration of the undocumented stay of those who do not comply. This
effectively generates a larger equilibrium stock of undocumented workers.
In summary, salary withholding schemes and overstay penalties must be
carefully set in relation to the environment that guest workers face at
home and abroad to be effective in reducing the stock of undocumented
foreign workers. By contrast, as we have seen in the preceding discussion
on employer sanctions and the implied wage penalty in the underground
economy, an increase in  unambiguously reduces the stock of illegal
aliens, regardless of the initial value of that instrument.
Migration costs
Let us examine next the implications of a reduction in the pecuniary cost
of migration facing a guest worker, such as the cost of an entry visa,
recruitment fees, or even in the tax imposed by H on the country’s employ-
ers seeking authorization to hire guest workers. Such taxes are typically
passed on to the workers in the form of a higher recruitment fee.
18 This finding has fundamentally the same basis as the discussion in Djajic´ (2001) on the
relationship between the cost of illegal entry and the duration of an undocumented
migrant’s stay in the host country.
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The downward shift of the MN schedule in panel (a) of Figure 4 shows
that a reduction in K from 2- to 1-year’s worth of source-country earnings
makes migration more attractive relative to a permanent stay at home.
A lower migration cost also enables a guest worker to attain larger hold-
ings of accumulated assets during her documented stay in H, for any given
values of w and . This reduces the need for a guest worker to overstay,
shifting the MO locus up and to the left. Note, in addition, that if K is
lower, those who overstay do so for a shorter period of time, as shown by
the leftward shift of the X locus in panel (b) of Figure 4. The intuition
behind this result is the same as before. Lower migration costs relax
a migrant’s budget constraint and reduce the optimal duration of the
overstay phase of the planning horizon.19
4.2 Role of the economic environment: return on savings, the price level, and
initial assets
As we turn to the economic environment facing a migrant at home and
abroad, we find that a higher rate of return, r, on investments at home
shifts the MN schedule in Figure 5 down and to the left, as it makes
migration more attractive relative to staying at home. Migration is for
the purpose of asset accumulation, which is relatively more beneficial to
a migrant when r is greater (Djajic´ 2010).20 By contrast, a larger cost-of-
living differential between the host and the source country (i.e. a higher p)
makes migration relatively less attractive by imposing a higher cost of
consumption abroad. In Figure 6, this implies a shift of the MN schedule
up and to the right. Note, however, that both an increase in r and an
increase in p serve to strengthen the incentives for strict compliance on
the part of guest workers. They both make it more attractive to go back to
the source country at the end of the contract, because a higher return on
repatriated savings is now available in that location and the price of con-
sumption is relatively lower. This is shown by the leftward shift of the MO
schedule in panel (a) of Figures 5, where r is raised from 6 to 8% and in
Figure 6, where p is raised from 2 to 2.2. Moreover, a higher return on
investments at home and a larger international price differential do not
only make the incentives for strict compliance stronger, but they also raise
the cost of overstaying an extra instant relative to the benefit. This calls for
19 See Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988) on the relationship between migration costs and the
optimal timing of return for temporary migrants.
20 If an individual’s initial asset stock is above a certain critical level, it is more attractive to
remain in S and enjoy the rate r (>r) on those asset holdings, rather than to go abroad
where the wage is relatively higher. In such cases, an increase in r makes staying at home
even more attractive. We assume that for those contemplating becoming a guest worker
abroad, initial asset holdings are not above this critical level.
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a shorter optimal duration of an overstay, should the incentives for strict
compliance prove to be insufficient: The X locus in panels (b) of Figures 5
and 6 shifts to the left.
This analysis confirms the findings of Schiff (2007) and Djajic´ (2013)
that successful management of a guest-worker program hinges to a
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Figure 4 Implications of a reduction in migration costs.
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significant extent on the economic conditions in the countries of origin of
program participants. A higher expected rate of return on repatriated
assets and a higher foreign price level both serve to attract migrants
back home. Selection criteria that give preference to migrants from coun-
tries characterized by a relatively high r and/or a larger price differential
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between the host and source countries can (other things being equal) help
reduce the number of guest workers who choose to overstay. The new
finding here is that workers from such countries not only have greater
incentives to comply with the rules of the program, but should they choose
not to return home as scheduled, the optimal duration of their overstay
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phase is relatively shorter. Similarly, as noted by Djajic´ (2013), guest
workers who have larger initial asset holdings are less inclined to overstay.
We can now add that if a worker with relatively larger initial asset hold-
ings does choose to overstay, he/she will do so for a shorter period of time.
4.3 The retirement phase and benefits
Introducing the retirement phase into the model serves to strengthen a
worker’s motive to migrate with a view of accumulating assets for the
purpose of supporting consumption during retirement at home. The
longer the retirement phase, the greater the need for accumulated savings,
as a worker’s income (other than from accumulated assets) is assumed to
drop to the level of retirement benefits, b, after time T. This can be seen in
panel (a) of Figure 7, where the MN schedule shifts down and to the left if
we increase R from 10 to 20 years. The incentive to overstay is similarly
stronger for the same reason, as reflected in a shift to the right of the MO
locus in panel (a) and the X schedule in panel (b). A longer retirement
phase requires that earnings over the T working years of the planning
horizon be spread to cover consumption over a longer lifetime. This
gives guest workers a stronger incentive (i) to overstay rather than to
return at the end of the contract and (ii) to overstay for a longer period
of time.
Retirement benefits at home, with their money value reflected in the
flow b in our model, help offset the need for greater asset accumulation
that made the incentives for migration and overstaying stronger with an
increase in R. An increase in b therefore has the opposite effect (not
shown) on the MN and MO schedules. Recruitment of guest workers
from countries with more generous retirement benefits and other social
programs that reduce the need for personal savings to pay for consump-
tion over the retirement phase should therefore help host countries lower
the number of guest workers who overstay and reduce the average dur-
ation of the overstay phase of those who do not comply with the rules of
the program.
Our modeling of the retirement phase is admittedly very simple. Every
source country worker is assumed to be entitled to the same benefit b
regardless of whether and how long she has worked abroad. If we were
to consider in a more general setting the possibility of transferring pension
benefits from the host to the source country or assume that b is positively
related to the number of years of work in the source country, both elem-
ents would serve to deter guest workers from overstaying. For those who
overstay nonetheless, their optimal duration of overstay would be shorter.
This follows from the fact that international portability of pension benefits
relaxes a guest worker’s budget constraint, reducing her need to overstay,
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while a direct relationship between b and the number of years of work
in the source country imposes an additional cost for overstaying abroad
an instant longer (as an undocumented worker employed in H is unable
to accumulate pension credits). This shortens the optimal duration of the
overstay phase in the event a guest worker chooses not to return home at
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the end of her contract. International agreements on the portability of
pension benefits may therefore serve the host countries as a useful
policy instrument in their fight against illegal immigration. From the
point of view of a migrant (i) it increases the attractiveness of being a
documented rather than an undocumented worker while abroad, as pen-
sion credits can be accumulated only in the formal sector and (ii) by
providing a larger flow of retirement resources, it reduces a guest worker’s
incentive to overstay in the host country as an undocumented alien.21
5 Conclusions
The main objective of this article is to examine the role of immigration
policies and the economic environment facing foreign workers in deter-
mining whether participants in a guest-worker program choose to overstay
or to return voluntarily to their countries of origin at the end of their
contract period. For parameter values that reflect typical economic and
policy environments that the guest workers face in the host countries, an
environment in which they would prefer to stay longer than allowed by the
rules of the program, it is necessary for the authorities to provide
an adequate incentive structure in order to achieve strict compliance.
We consider in the present study the role of a salary-withhold scheme,
a fine for overstaying, and employer sanctions that reduce the market
wage of undocumented aliens. Tougher employer sanctions are shown
to lower the incentive to remain in the host country beyond the expiration
of the work permit and to encourage those who overstay to return rela-
tively sooner to their country of origin. A higher salary withholding rate
and a fine for overstaying also serve to discourage workers from overstay-
ing. Should they nonetheless choose to stay beyond the expiration of the
work permit, these policies actually induce the overstayers to remain in
the host country for a longer period of time. This implies that increases
in the salary withholding rate or in other forms of pecuniary penalties
that fall short of being sufficient to guarantee strict compliance with
the rules of program are counterproductive with respect to the goal of
reducing the stock of undocumented aliens in the economy. They fail to
21 A number of migrant-sending and -receiving countries have in fact bilateral social secur-
ity agreements that provide for portability of contributions and entitlements of migrant
workers and their families. The EU has been particularly active in establishing bilateral
social security agreements with its neighbors. Note however that only around 1% of
migrants in Africa and Asia are covered by bilateral agreements between the migrant-
sending and -receiving country (Holzmann et al. 2005). By contrast, most of the migrants
from Europe, North America, and Oceania work in countries with bilateral agreements.
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reduce the flow of guest workers transiting to undocumented status, yet
they increase the duration of the undocumented stay of those who do
become illegal aliens. This effectively generates a larger equilibrium
stock of undocumented workers. Thus, the salary withholding rate and
overstay fine must be carefully designed in relation to the environment
that guest workers face at home and abroad to be effective in reducing the
stock of undocumented workers.
Lowering the cost of migration is found to make overstaying less
attractive. Should some workers still choose to overstay, they will do so
for a shorter period of time. Both a higher rate of return on investments at
home and a larger cost-of-living differential between the host and the
source country, help strengthen the incentives for strict compliance on
the part of guest workers and shorten the optimal duration of an overstay,
should the incentives for strict compliance prove to be insufficient.
Retirement benefits at home also reduce the incentives for overstaying.
Selecting guest workers from countries that offer their citizens more gen-
erous retirement benefits, that have relatively low price levels, and where
returnees can enjoy high yields on repatriated savings, other things being
equal, can help host countries lower the number of guest workers who
overstay and reduce the optimal duration of the overstay phase for those
who fail to comply with the rules of the program. Selection criteria that
admit only guest workers with asset holdings above a certain minimum
level also works in the same direction.
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A Appendix
A.1 A Guest Worker who Overstays
This Appendix examines in more detail the optimization problem facing
a migrant who chooses to overstay in the host country. The Lagrangian
can be written as follows:
Los ¼
Z þx
0
ðcost Þ1
1  e
tdtþ
Z TþR
þx
ðcost Þ1
1  e
tdtþ os
(
A0  K erðþxÞ
þ
Z 
0
½wð1 Þ  pcost er
tdtþ
Z þx

½wð1 Þ  pcost er
tdt
þ erðþxÞ
Z T
þx
½w pcost erðtxÞdtþ
Z TþR
T
½b pcost erðtxÞdt
 
;
ð17Þ
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The first-order conditions consist of the budget constraint (12) and:
@Los
@cost
¼ ðcost Þet  osper
t ¼ 0; ð18Þ
@Los
@cost
¼ ðcost Þet  ospertþðrr
ÞðþxÞ ¼ 0; ð19Þ
@Los
@x
¼ ðc
os
þxÞ1
1  
ðcosþxÞ1
1 
" #
eðþxÞþ
þ oserðþxÞfr þ wð1 Þ  pcosþx  wþ pcosþx  ðr rÞAþxg ¼ 0;
ð20Þ
where
Aþx ¼ 
Z T
þx
½w pcost erðtxÞdtþ
Z TþR
T
½b pcost erðtxÞdt
 
is the stock of assets repatriated by the migrant at  þ x to support his/her
consumption over the remainder of the planning horizon. Equation (18)
implies that, with  ¼ r; the consumption rate abroad of a guest worker
who chooses to overstay is constant at the rate cos ¼ ðposÞ1=, while
eqs. (18) and (19) imply that his/her consumption rate after return to the
source country is
cost ¼ cosðp=pÞ1=eð
rr
 ÞðtxÞ; t 2 ½ þ x;T: ð21Þ
For the duration of the overstay phase to be optimal, Equation (20) must
hold. It states that the utility cost of overstaying an instant longer, as
represented by the difference between the flow of utility enjoyed just
after return and that enjoyed just before return,
ðcosþxÞ1
1 
ðcosþxÞ1
1 , must
be equal to the net benefit. The latter consists of the utility value
of the increase in the stock of assets held by the migrant as a result of
overstaying an instant longer, as shown by the second term of Equation
(20). There are several components here. First, by overstaying an
instant longer, the migrant postpones the payment of the exit fine, ,
which contributes r to his/her asset holdings. Second, by overstaying
an instant longer, the migrant is saving abroad rather than consuming
in excess of income at home. This increases asset holdings by
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wð1 Þ  pcosþx  wþ pcosþx. Finally, by overstaying an instant longer,
the migrant earns the rate of return r (rather than r) on the stock of assets
to be repatriated for the purpose of supporting consumption after return
to S. This loss of interest is represented by ðr rÞAþx in the second term
of Equation (20).
To understand the intuition of how various parameters of the model
affect the optimal duration of the overstay phase, attention should be
focused first on Equation (20), which gives an indication of the necessary
change in consumption (and thus os), such that the condition continues
to hold and second, on the budget constraint, which dictates how long
the migrant must overstay in order to meet the cost of the optimal time
profile of consumption. These two conditions, along with what we know
about the time path of consumption from eqs. (18) and (19), enable us to
solve simultaneously for cos and x. Consider, for example, the case of a
change in the wage penalty facing undocumented workers. For a given
path of consumption and the duration of the overstay phase, an increase
in  reduces the saving rate and hence the benefit of overstaying an instant
longer. To equate the cost and the benefit, consumption must fall to
increase the marginal utility of consumption (os) and hence the utility
value of the benefit (i.e. savings generated by overstaying), to the point
where Equation (20) is satisfied. A drop in consumption and the rise in ,
however, have opposite effects on the budget constraint. Lower consump-
tion relaxes it, while lower earnings over the undocumented phase tighten
it. For the parameter values used in the benchmark case and for any
degree of concavity of the utility function, ; that gives rise to an internal
solution for x, the first effect dominates. That is, the optimal reduction
in cos is sufficiently large such that a shorter duration of the overstay
phase is required to simultaneously satisfy the budget constraint and
Equation (20).
More formally, the simultaneous solution for cos and x is obtained
as follows: with the aid of (21) and noting that os ¼ ðcosÞp , we can
express (20) as
ðcosÞ1
1  1
p
p
 1 

" #
þ ðc
osÞ
p
(
r þ wð1 Þ  w
 pcos 1 p

p
 1 

" #
þ ðr rÞ w 1 e
rðTxÞ
r

 pcos p

p
 1 
 egðTþRxÞ  1
g
þ b e
rðTxÞ  erðTþRxÞ
r
)
¼ 0; ð22Þ
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which enables us to write:
pcos ¼
w 1 ðrrÞð1erðTxÞÞr
h i
 wð1 Þ  r  ðr rÞb 1erRr erðTxÞ

1 1 p

p
 	1

 
 ðr rÞ pp
 	1
 egðTþRxÞ1
g
:
ð23Þ
Using (21) in the budget constraint (12), we obtain the following:
pcos ¼
A0  K erðþxÞ
þ w ð1 Þð1 e
rÞ þ ð1 Þðer  erðþxÞÞ
r
 
þ erðþxÞ w 1 e
rðTxÞ
r
þ b 1 e
rR
r
erðTxÞ
 
8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
9>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>;
,
1 erðþxÞ
r
þ p

p
 1 

er
ðþxÞ e
gðTþRxÞ  1
g
( )
:
ð24Þ
Finally, by equating (23) to (24), we can solve simultaneously for cos and
the optimal return date,  þ x, as functions of the model’s parameters.
Using these solutions in (11) yields the discounted welfare, Vos; of a
guest worker who overstays in H until he/she finds it optimal to return
to S. As an analytic solution is not available, we use numerical methods in
analyzing our model in Sections 3 and 4.
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